

FORCE MANAGEMENT

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General Studies

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

FORCE MANAGEMENT, by MAJ Dan R. Monsivais, 54 pages.

The Army needs educated and trained force managers who can effect change and can integrate into the numerous force management processes. The problem is that as Army officers are selected into the force management functional area, they are sent to division, corps, and Army Service component command (ASCC) assignments armed with prior knowledge and a four-week course at Fort Belvoir. Thus, the central research question is: Does the Army adequately train its force managers to make them functional at the division, corps, and ASCC staff level? Doctrine at various levels stipulates knowledge needed at the division, corps, and ASCC to be able to effect change, and integrate requests into the Command Plan, Total Army Analysis and Program Objective Memorandum. Lastly, doctrine stipulates that knowledge is required to integrate personnel and equipment at the unit level. The first step reviewed all doctrine to determine what force managers need to know. The second step reviewed program of instruction from Army schools, two of which are part of the Professional Military Education institutions--the War College and the Command and General Staff College. The program of instruction review process examined the content taught on force management and its relevancy toward doctrine and application at the division, corps, and ASCC. To quantify and qualify attitudes toward education received on force management, a survey was conducted of force management officers at the division, corps, and ASCCs. Analysis of programs of instruction, doctrine and surveys revealed a need to reexamine content of instruction and provide instruction that is relevant to the needs of officers being assigned to divisions, corps, and ASCCs in force management positions.

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ACRONYMS

AFMS	Army Force Management School
AFM	Army Flow Model
ALMC	Army Logistics Management College
ALO	authorized level of organization
AMT	Army modernization training
ASA (M&RA)	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
ASCC	Army Service component command
CAS3	Combined Arms and Services Staff School
CCSS	Commodity Command Standard System
CDMD	Combat Development Materiel Development
CELP	Civilian Employment Level Plan
CENDOC	centralized documentation
CF	career field
CFD	career field designation
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CGSOC	Command and General Staff Officer Course
CINC	Commander-in-Chief (a term being replaced by combatant commander)
CMICS	Civilian Manpower Integrated Costing System
CPLAN	Command Plan
CSPAR	CINC's Preparedness Assessment Report
CSS	combat service support
DOD	Department of Defense

DPG	Defense Program Guidance
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities
EDATE	effective date
FA	functional area
FD	Force Developer or Force Development
FI	Force Integration or Force Integrator
FM	field manual
G3	Operations officer at division and above
HQDA	Headquarters Department of the Army
IAW	in accordance with
ICAD	Individual Concern and Deficiency
IO	Information Operations
JP	joint publication
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
JWCA	Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments
KOD	Knowledge-on-Demand
LEDC	Logistics Executive Development Course
MACOM	major command
MAM	Materiel Acquisition Management
MN	Main
MTOE	modified table of organization and equipment
MTF-E	Manning the Force-Enlisted

MTDA	modified table of distribution and allowances (an obsolete term today, but still in doctrine)
ODP	Officer Distribution Plan
OER	Officer Evaluation Report
OPCF	Operational Career Field
OPMS	Officer Professional Management System
OPS	operations
OSCF	Operational Support Career Field
PD	Plans Division
PE	practical exercise
PME	Professional Military Education
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
POI	program of instruction
PPBES	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RC	Reserve Component
S3	Operations officer at brigade or regiment and below
SACS	Structure and Composition System
SAMAS	Structure and Manpower Allocation System
SME	subject matter expert
SOP	standard operating procedure
TAA	Total Army Analysis
TAP	The Army Plan
TAV	Total Army Visibility

TOE	table of organization and equipment
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
UIC	unit identification code
USCRFM	United States Code, Roles, Functions, Missions

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The design and functionality of the Army of the future will rest in the hands of current and future force managers who will not only design it, but also ensure that it is properly fielded to the gaining units. To achieve all embedded and implied tasks, the Army needs officers who not only possess the genuine desire to perform, but also the know-how appropriate to their staff levels. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* asserts, “Modernization will transform Army force projection capabilities” (2001, 3-1). Draft manual FM 3-93, *The Army in Theater Operations* requires the plans and readiness division of the G3 to “forward requirements for equipment and training” (2001, A-14). To meet such requirements, trained, functional officers need to be ready at every level in order to make Army force structure changes. This is truer today as the Army plans to transform at every level, enabling it to be more strategically responsive. While there is a requirement for generally understanding how the Army runs as an organization, there is a greater demand for “doing,” knowing “how-to,” and operating within the organization. Every Army staff level has different performance requirements; for example, everyone needs to understand how to call for indirect fire, but it is not executed at division staff, corps staff, or Army Service component command (ASCC) level. The requirements of the division-level-and-above staffs are more in processing those requests than adjusting the indirect fire.

Background

At the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Army in the 1990s, a military officer study was conducted to improve the Army's warfighting capabilities, offering officers the opportunity for success, while balancing grades and skills. Since the inception of Officer Professional Management System (OPMS) XXI in the 1990s, the study results and implementation clearly separated officer skills defining who was going to have an opportunity to command while allowing for greater opportunities for those officers who would support. In the end, the Army categorized its officer corps in four areas: operations (the command track), information operations, institutional support and operational support. In appendix A is a brief description of each career field (CF) and the functional areas (FA) within each.

The career field selection process has been and remains simple. As officers approach promotion to major, they submit a career-field preference statement indicating in which CF and FA they wish to serve and compete for promotion during their field-grade years. This process, known as career-field designation (CFD), considers the officer's preference statement, performance, rater and senior rater input from the new officer evaluation report (OER), and the needs of the Army. Later, a separate board of officers meeting after the major's promotion board designates where each officer can best serve the Army.

The question of specialty training came into question in the final analysis of OPMS XXI, where the study recognized that it was imperative to train these specialized officers before assignment. For some career fields, specifically the 53 functional area (System Automation Acquisition), extensive training is provided, allowing for immediate

involvement once standard operating procedures (SOPs) are learned at the unit or organization. Likewise, foreign area officers are sent to school, then to their assigned country or region to further expand their knowledge. As is apparent, some career fields were able to make easier transitions than others in the preparation of their officers.

The force management functional area on the other hand, had a different transition. A course was developed to introduce newly selected officers to how the Army operates and the many processes that make up the field of force management. With limited experience and similarly with previous experience, force management officers have to quickly gain an understanding of the force management field and pass the force management course, as this is the initial gateway for advancement. Upon graduation, graduates of the course are sent to their next assignment and begin operating in the force management cycle as shown in appendix B. All newly assigned personnel require much tutoring, as they attempt to decipher not only new terminology, but also processing actions required at the Army staff level.

Scope

As indicated by the thesis topic and the primary question, the research will focus on Army force management, although force management is also practiced by other Services and organizations within the Department of Defense. Further, the focus will be centered at the Army division, corps, and ASCC.

Further, the research will primarily be scoped at the active component level. This also means that civilians will be omitted from the research. Even though government service civilians perform similar force management duties at each of the researched levels, the scope will be focused as previously stated.

The Research Question

The primary question related to the topic of this thesis is: Does the Army adequately train its force managers to make them functional at the division, corps, and Army Service component command level staffs?

Research Overview

To address the question of education, preparation, and functionality of a force management officer, the following secondary questions will be addressed to conduct the research.

1. What training does the Army provide institutionally on force management for divisional, corps or ASCC level staff officers?
2. Which institutions provide training and education in force management?
3. What do force managers need to know in force management for each level of command: division, corps, and ASCC?

To collect needed data, programs of instructions from the various institutions will be sought. Contact will be established with Army institutions that teach force management so that all programs of instruction to be reviewed at the same time. In the review process, the criteria for analysis will consist of doctrinal manuals that cover the three staff levels addressed in the thesis question, where assertions on G3 requirements are made.

To ensure the educational institution is providing the needed education and training, a survey will be conducted of all those force management officers currently serving in positions at the division, corps, and ASCC level. Once data are collected, analysis will be conducted to determine if they answer the hypothesis.

Definitions

In order to understand the terminology throughout the thesis, a listing of key terms will allow for ease of understanding. Though not all-inclusive, both FM 100-11, *Force Integration* and the handbook titled, *How the Army Runs, A Senior Leader Reference Handbook*, from the United States Army War College (USAWC), provide a vast listing of force management terminology.

Functional refers to an individual that is knowledgeable and able to perform force management tasks.

FM 100-11 defines force management as the capstone process that encompasses all processes associated with the progression from requirements determination through execution of the time-phased programs and structures for resourcing. It involves the rank ordering of requirements and the resources applied to these requirements. To accomplish Army missions and functions within resource constraints, force management allocates resources and assesses their utilization. Force management includes several developmental processes, specifically combat development, doctrine development, training development, materiel development, and organization development (Department of the Army (DA) 1998, 4-1).

The Army Plan (TAP) provides strategic guidance that focuses on long-term direction of where the Army leadership wishes to go. It starts with the enduring core competency and translates it into capabilities, which ultimately produce the program and budget (DA 2001-2002, 4-13). In short, it provides programmers and budgeters with insights to consider alternative means and to relate their decisions to planning guidance.

The Defense Program Guidance (DPG) is guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense that places responsibility and authority for program execution with the Services and other Department of Defense components (DA 2001-2002, 7-21). It presents the Secretary's strategic plan for developing and employing future forces. Additionally, it provides policy, articulating strategic objectives and the national military strategy, force and resource guidance to the Services and other Department of Defense agencies, to include the combatant commanders, allowing them all to prepare their Program Objective Memorandum.

The Program Objective Memorandum (POM) is a process that allows the Services to submit quality cost estimates to identify budget requirements (DA 2001-2002, 5-17).

Total Army Analysis (TAA) is a phased force structure analysis that examines the projected Army force from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives. (DA 1995, 1)

The Command Plan (CPLAN) implements TAA or Force Feasibility Review (FFR) and other authoritative force structure related decisions (DA 1997a, 84).

The Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) is a modification of a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) that incorporates unit identification code (UIC), unit designation, authorized level of organization (ALO), and the effective date (EDATE) for activation or reorganization of a unit.

Force integration (FI) is the actual process of linking documents and equipment to units and soldiers.

Limitations

In order to answer the primary and secondary questions successfully and to keep the length of this study within reasonable limits, some limitation must be placed on this thesis.

This research is being limited to officers currently in division, corps, and Army Service component command positions, primarily because that is where the majority of officers are expected to work as they enter the force management functional area. There are many other positions that could be addressed, but would require different research methods and questions along with more time to gather needed data. Should more research be considered, it would be recommended to expand into all force management areas.

Although other Services conduct similar functions in the area of force management, this research will be Army-specific. Additionally, while recognizing that noncommissioned officers also perform functions in force management, this research will be limited to officers. Furthermore, it will be limited to Army active duty officers. To this end, the research will not limit itself to specific officer rank, as captains, majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels could be working at division, corps, or Army Service component command.

The next limitation is on the teaching institutions. This research will only include the schools or colleges that provide formal Army education and training for the target population, i.e., where majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels are most likely to attend by either Army selection or unit sponsorship. The research will extend to all ten active Army division, four corps, and five Army Service component commands.

Delimitations

The basis for this thesis is the doctrinal requirements of force managers derived from capstone thru branch-principle doctrine. Accordingly, only those doctrinal manuals that address such requirements at division, corps, and ASCC will be used.

It is not the aim of this paper to study the processes, but instead the education and training Army institutions provide to prepare force managers for assignment. Similarly, the last delimitation is the fact that the thesis is not concerned with how force managers are taught, but rather subject matter content that prepares and trains them for their functional area.

Significance

As the Army continues to transform, the need for force management knowledgeable officers will become even more demanding. Questions such as those listed below will need answers:

1. How can organizations change?
2. When is the right time for processing changes?
3. How do we activate or inactivate organizations?

There are many implications to Army force structure that one may not recognize until it is too late but to capture them as a lessons learned. A review of what is taught to force managers can provide, or at a minimum, suggest the initiation of a needs analysis into the training and education of force managers who are going to divisions, corps, and Army Service component commands.

In the upcoming years, and beyond the objective force, it will be force managers who will not only design and resource the Army, but actually integrate it at its lowest

levels. Such knowledge and abilities will free commanders at every echelon of such details, allowing them to focus on the employment of new equipment, refining employment of troops enhancing warfighting skills.

Summary

Many significant contributions have been made in the Army over the years. Most recently was the guidance for the specialization of officers, and now the transformation of the Army as a whole. It is clear that terms such as POM, TAA, MTOE, and DPG may be understood in definition, but there is much more to know in order to operate within the force management cycle, as each process presents a different challenge. Not being able to function or operate within the cycle of Army processes will hamper units. This can lead to reactive actions by staffs and commanders, eliciting questions or exclamations such as, “Why is this happening?” and “Where are we going wrong?” It is not enough to read about Army processes, but also to be able to operate within them. This is the challenge that is being addressed in this research: Are Army institutions preparing force managers to be functional at the division, corps, and Army Service component command.

Since the G3s or S3s at divisions, corps, or Army Service component commands are expected to manage their existing structure so their organizations can accomplish their respective missions. The G3 or S3 must provide guidance and approve force management actions, leaving the analysis on force structure and submissions to the force manager in their command.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Background

While researching this thesis numerous articles addressing the need for change in the officer education system were available. Most centered on the Officer Personnel Management System Study from the late 1990's that became known as OPMS XXI (DA 1997c, 9-1). OPMS XXI was a study that looked at ways to prepare the officer personnel system for the twenty first century. As stated in chapter 1, it divided commissioned officers into four categories where the officers would be managed separately and compete for command and promotion within their specific career fields and functional areas. Many articles on the subject of officer management were posted to the Internet, including a Government Accounting Office analysis addressing force reduction at the institutional level (Richard 1998, Letter 5). Embedded in OPMS XXI was the need for officer professional development and education, which is the basis of this thesis.

Army Doctrine

While researching Army doctrine, several manuals specifically addressed tasks to conduct within respective levels of command. FM 3-93 subscribes to the force management and readiness branch of the operations staff at the operational level (ASCC headquarters) the function of overseeing force modernization and combat developments. It states that it "reviews Army, joint, and combined concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (2001e, A18). Further, FM 3-93 indicates that the commander or the operations officer involved in providing policy guidance in the fielding of new

equipment. FM 3-93 states that the commander or operations officer “provides guidance, coordination, and supervision of command Individual Concern and Deficiency (ICAD) issues IAW JP1-03.31” (DA 2001e, A-18). Moreover, the force manager “consolidates input from staff sections and forwards for inclusion in the CINC's Preparedness Assessment Report (CSPAR)” (DA 2001e, A-18).

FM 3-0 asserts that “the Army also maintains the structure and expertise necessary to develop, acquire, and supply the equipment and supplies for full spectrum operations. In addition to supplying Army forces, the Army manages certain commodities, such as conventional ammunition, for all services. It also maintains the research and development capabilities and linkages to the US industrial base that gives Army forces the best equipment in the world” (DA 2001c, 1-7).

Review of Draft FM 6.0 revealed that this manual is replacing FM 101-5 when it is approved for print, accordingly, it will be used in this research for comparison as the data being used for analysis is expected to remain the same. Draft FM 6-0 *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, specifically states that the G3 (S3) is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning training, operations, plans, force development and modernization. Specific responsibilities of the G3 (S3) include the following force development and modernization areas and activities:

- Developing and recommending a planned or programmed force structure.
- Processing procedures for unit activation, inactivation, establishment, discontinuance, and reorganization (force accounting).
- Fielding new weapons and equipment systems (force modernization).
- Evaluating the organizational structure, functions, and workload of military and civilian personnel to ensure their proper use and requirements (manpower utilization and requirements).
- Allocating manpower resources to subordinate commands within established ceilings and guidance (manpower allocation).

- Developing and revising unit force data for documenting any changes to the MTOE and modification table of distribution and allowances (MTDA).
- Planning and conducting formal, on-site manpower and equipment surveys.
- Recording and reporting data for information, planning and programming, allocation, and justification (manpower reports).
- Ensuring MTDA and MTOE documents reflect the minimum essential and most economical equipment needed to accomplish the assigned mission.
- The G3 determines qualitative and quantitative personnel requirements for new equipment and systems. (DA 2002, D15-18)

In similar form FM 101-5 *Staff Organization and Operations*, specifies that the G3/S3 is responsible for force development and modernization and it conducts the following:

- Reviewing, analyzing, and recommending a planned or programmed force structure.
- Processing procedures for unit activation, inactivation, establishment, discontinuance, and reorganization (force accounting).
- Fielding new weapons and equipment systems (force modernization).
- Evaluating the organizational structure, functions, and workload of military and civilian personnel to ensure their proper use and requirements (manpower utilization and requirements).
- Allocating manpower resources to subordinate commands within established ceilings and guidance (manpower allocation).
- Developing and revising unit force data for documenting any changes to the MTOE and modification table of distribution and allowances (MTDA).
- Planning and conducting formal, on-site manpower and equipment surveys.
- Recording and reporting data for information, planning and programming, allocation, and justification (manpower reports).
- Ensuring MTDA and MTOE documents reflect the minimum-essential and most economical equipment needed to accomplish the assigned mission.
- The G3 determines qualitative and quantitative personnel requirements for new equipment and systems. (DA 1997b, 4-13)

With regards to warfighting while fielding new equipment, FM 3-90 *Tactics*, states,

Tactical fundamentals do not change with the fielding of each new piece of equipment. However, the integration of new equipment and organizations usually requires changes in related techniques and procedures. (DA 2001d, xiii)

The purpose for reviewing these numerous doctrinal assertions is to provide a glimpse of the doctrine that set the foundation for the thesis. Army doctrine is unambiguous about the force management functions that must be performed, or rather, are expected to be performed. Next, references will be made to the literature available that specifically addresses the need for trained and educated officers.

Leader Development

In order to address the officer leader development requirement and answer secondary questions, research was specifically conducted on literature that addressed needs of the Army at specific levels: division, corps, and ASCC. In 2002, the Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study made some findings that specifically addressed the issues of officer training and education. Specifically it acknowledges that there is a need for more specific training (U.S. DA 2001a). Similarly, a *Joint Force Quarterly* article written by James K. Morningstar states that the Army needs to be able to “reconstruct organizations to provide small unit commanders with the needed equipment enabling them to succeed” (1997, 41, 43). This assertion alludes to the basic requirement of having someone that can develop Army organizations, and can additionally create them to operate in a Joint environment. General Donn A. Starry’s article in *Military Review* also refers to the requirement of having all officers educated in the same way, able to reach a collective consensus in the equipping of organizations (1983, 22).

More fundamentally, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce T. Caine of the United States Army writes about the impacts that modernization can have on a unit (1983, 21-33). He writes about the total involvement of the leadership and the demands new equipment

place on leaders and soldiers alike. It is important to note that in the nineteen eighties there were no force managers at the division level, leaving the division with the problem of selecting an officer to manage the fielding and integration of equipment, which is much different today. Because of OPMS XXI, the burden addressed above is eliminated at the division level by authorizing a force management officer who coordinates and synchronizes integration of all modernization.

In his 1984 article reprinted in a 1997 issue of Military Review, retired Brigadier General (then Colonel) Huba Wass de Czege asserted that the “Army must be willing to invest time in officer education for the long term, adding that sometimes we opt for the short term training in skills which are perishable” (Wass de Czege 1997, 173). His article clearly suggests that the Army must make the investment in itself for the future. A recent study conducted by United States Army War College students addressed the changes that the Army is currently experiencing with Army transformation (Filiberti et al. 2001, 1-29). Though not specifically stated, the study insinuates that there is the requirement for personnel who have understanding not only in the creation or in development of organizations, but also the reduction and reconfiguration of units.

Institutional Instructional Material

Similarly, research was conducted at institutions that teach force management for analysis of subject matter, helping to answer secondary questions. Programs of instruction were collected electronically from the Command and General Staff College, the Army War College, the Army Logistics Management College and the Army Force Management School. It was determined early in the process that these institutions provide

training and education to officers, providing what each institution believes to be the right amount of information for those that attend.

Summary of Literature to Date

Within the sphere of this thesis on force management, the amount of information is limited. However, the content of instruction provided by the four institutions previously mentioned will provide much information into what formal training all Army officers are getting, as well as the level of training that could be beneficial for force managers. The studies conducted by the Army into Army Training and Leader Development, along with the doctrinal requirements, will serve to answer the thesis question. The survey conducted will also provide insight toward answering the thesis question. The research methodology will be addressed in the next chapter, with the analysis in chapter 4.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this research design is to provide focus in sifting through large amounts of information that are both relevant and irrelevant, leading to the answer the thesis question. The problem statement examines the development in career fields and functional areas; it questions if the Army prepares its force managers to operate at the division, corps, or Army Service component command level. As was addressed in chapter 1, the research scope is narrowed to active duty Army officers and to institutions that teach force management.

Thesis Question

Does the Army adequately train its force managers to be functional at the division, corps, and Army Service component command level? This question guides and directs the research design. In order to answer the primary question, several secondary questions were created. These questions will serve as criteria for evaluation, and allow for the development of relevant survey questions for the purpose of validating research data.

Secondary Questions

The first question queries the training Army institutions provide on force management for divisional, corps, and ASCC level staff officers. To answer this question, curriculum content will be reviewed and analyzed for its level, relevance, type of training, and instruction provided.

The next question asks: Which institutions provide training and education on force management? This question will refine the down selection process for determining the institutions to analyze for research. As stated in chapter 1, the focus will be on Army institutions only, while it is recognized that civilians and other Services have programs that teach force management.

The last question asks: What do force managers need to know? This question will be answered by reviewing doctrine, doctrine that is applicable to force managers at the division, corps, and ASCC level. It's expected that the review of applicable doctrine will provide the "what" for this research.




Figure 1. Title. Analytical Model comprised of the Army Imperatives and the Organizational Life Cycle Model. Source: (U.S. DA 2001b, 28), (U.S. DA 1998, 1-11).

In order to give structure to the research and guide the analysis, established models were selected to guide the research design. The focus will primarily be on the development training from each of the models, which are part of the Army imperatives and the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model as depicted in Figure 1, respectively. FM

1, *The Army* asserts that “the Army is doctrine based and has always been doctrine based.” (U.S. DA 2001b, 28) To this end, doctrine will serve as the basis for research and analysis. Similarly, FM 100-11, *Force Integration* asserts that as part of the Army Life Cycle Model (U.S. DA 1998, 1-11), the Army will train to ensure efficiency or proficiency, which too will serve as a means to answer the primary question of preparedness.

The Research Model

The research will examine available data and information to identify the extent to which force management officers are prepared for assignment at division, corps, and ASCC. The methodology is depicted in Figure 2, and subsequently explained for clarity.




Figure 2. Research Model

Of the nine methods of research-- historical, descriptive, developmental, case and field, correlational, causal comparative, true experiment, quasi experimental and action-- the descriptive research method will be used to formulate the means necessary to help answer the thesis question. As part of the comparative study, a survey will be used to assist in formulating the findings of the research. The survey method will help in verifying the doctrinal requirement and evaluate what the institutions provide to force managers. To begin the research, only field manuals relevant to the thesis will be reviewed. It is essential to review the field manual's content for specific requirements in force management. It is understood that manuals will not address force manager responsibility directly. Rather it is expected that force management responsibilities will be addressed in the functions of the G3 of a division, corps, or ASCC.

Doctrinal Responsibilities

Draft FM 6.0 and FM 101-5 similarly state that the G3 (S3) is the principal staff officer for force development and modernization (note that force development and force management are used synonymously by doctrine writers). Responsibilities and expected activities are outlined below as they relate to force management:

- Develop and recommend a planned or programmed force structure.
- Process procedures for unit activation, inactivation, establishment, discontinuance, and reorganization (force accounting).
- Field new weapons and equipment systems (force modernization).
- Evaluate the organizational structure, functions, and workload of military and civilian personnel to ensure their proper use and requirements (manpower utilization and requirements).
- Allocate manpower resources to subordinate commands within established ceilings and guidance (manpower allocation).
- Develop and revise unit force data for documenting any changes to the MTOE and modification table of distribution and allowances (MTDA).
- Plan and conduct formal, on-site manpower and equipment surveys.

- Record and report data for information, planning and programming, allocation, and justification (manpower reports).
- Ensure MTDA and MTOE documents reflect the minimum essential and most economical equipment needed to accomplish the assigned mission.
- The G3 determines qualitative and quantitative personnel requirements for new equipment and systems. (U.S. DA 2002, D-17)

These stated responsibilities from field manuals will serve as the means to review and analyze programs of instruction from Army institutions. For the purposes of clarity, relativity, and additional analysis, these responsibilities will be categorized into processes such as changes to documents, CPLAN preparation and submission, TAA (requirements/resourcing) processing and submission, and POM processing and submission.

As addressed in chapter 2, there are only four institutions whose programs of instruction will be reviewed: The Army War College, the Command and General Staff College, the Army Logistics Management College, and the Army Force Management School. The four institutions will not be compared, but reviewed independently using the doctrinal criteria. Further, Army force management officers working at division, corps, and ASCC are the selected target population for research.

As part of the research method, a survey will be used as the research instrument using the Likert Scale to measure attitude results in conjunction with the compilation of comments from qualitative questions. In order to conduct this survey, criteria must be established as they relate to the cyclical events in the Army such as changes to documents, the annual Command Plan, Total Army Analysis, and the Program Objective Memorandum. Survey results are expected to provide feedback and address whether Army institutions teach force management relative to the level stipulated by doctrine and

second, what graduates of these Army institutions qualitatively say about the training they received. In order to reach the target population, initial contact needs to be established via email or telephone. At the same time, contact will be established with the personnel officer who manages all force management functional area officers in the Army. He will be asked for contact information on those personnel who are assigned to divisions, corps, and ASCCs. To expedite the process, population data and survey questions will be developed at the same time.

Implementation

To implement the means for the research, field manuals will be downloaded from the Internet and reviewed for G3 responsibilities that address force management. Programs of instruction will be requested from the four institutions that are being analyzed and reviewed. Lastly, to verify the functionality of the institutional training, the aforementioned survey will be used as additional supporting data on training, preparation, and applicability.

It is important that survey questions are formulated to provide data that will be useful for analysis and conclusions. To achieve this, assistance and survey approval will be sought from the assessment division of the Command and General Staff College staff. The survey will consist of questions that can be quantified and others that are qualitative in nature to allow the population to state their own needs or preparation for a force management position. Since the population is small, and given that some units are currently deploying to the Middle East, some of the population will not be able to respond immediately. Such threat to internal validity will be addressed below during validity verification. Note that this research methodology is not built entirely on the

survey, although it will serve to exemplify the results of the other research. In an effort to mitigate a possible problem, the method of contact will be primarily e-mail, followed by telephone. The plan will be to deliver the survey and receive results via e-mail. Should respondents not reply via e-mail, attempts to complete the survey will be done telephonically. Should these measures not work, available data will be analyzed for inferences and conclusions.

Validity

The issue of external validity will be addressed by ensuring that only doctrine relevant to divisions, corps, and ASCCs is used and has application to all three levels. Similarly, only institutions that instruct force management as part of their curriculum will be reviewed. Lastly, during the survey process, the target population will consist of only those officers who are force managers and work at division, corps, and ASCC. This will allow for inferences and conclusions to be made at each level.

Next, threats to internal validity must be addressed. Threats to internal validity in survey research should be considered for various reasons. Initial analysis determined that mortality, location, and instrumentation were threats to the conduct of the survey. This became more evident as units began deploying to the Middle East. Though the surveys were sent to the target population who was deploying, some subjects may be lost because they cannot complete the survey. This threat is compounded by location, as some of the population may be unavailable due to security reasons, changed e-mails, and phone numbers. The last threat addresses the instrument. The instrument constructed so that the posed questions are easily answered, and there is an interest in completing the survey.

In the construct of questions, the following considerations will be used to formulate questions.

1. Is the question relevant to the thesis?
2. Is the question answering a primary or secondary question?
3. Is the question appropriate to the population?
4. Is the question clear and unambiguous?
5. Is the question leading in any way?
6. Will the respondents have valid input?

Qualitative questions must allow for expansion of quantitative responses. An initial list of question is listed below. The completed survey is at appendix C.

1. How long have you been in force management?
2. The institutional education that I have received has prepared me as a force manager.
3. In your first force management job, how long did it take you to be functional?
4. After completing the Force Management School, I was effective in the execution of my duties upon arrival to my force management job.
5. I consider myself effective at preparing the Army annual Command Plan at my level.
6. I consider myself effective at preparing the change to MTOE at my level.
7. I consider myself effective at preparing Total Army Analysis at my level.
8. In retrospect, what training do you wish you had prior to assignment as a force manager?

The plan is to interview and question the developer of the Army Force Management School, based on availability, on the education of force managers. To prepare for the interview, questions will have to be relevant toward force management and specifically focused on what force managers at the division, corps, and ASCC would need to be functional. For planning purposes, and to prevent similar responses, questions must be asked in specific order for the division, corps, and ASCC.

Assessment Criteria

The assessment measure will be the doctrine stipulated in field manuals such as FM 101-5, FM 3-0, FM 3-90, FM 3-93, and Draft FM 6-0. For better understanding and analysis, the requirements placed on the G3 by the aforementioned manuals will be reduced to four basic areas: (1) the ability to effect change on a unit by the proper processing and justification of requests for change using DA Form 2028. (2) the ability to balance military and civilian force structure accordingly through the annual CPLAN. (3) the process of preparing for Total Army Analysis and the arrangement involved at division through ASCC level for the requirements phase, followed by the resourcing phase, and (4) the process of preparing the Program Objective Memorandum.

The research will analyze POI content that addresses how requests for change are processed and whom to process to for approval. Additionally, it will analyze what students are taught on how to prepare at separate command levels for the submission of concept plans and changes to MTOEs. Moreover, the research will examine the preparation that must happen at each unit level for funding submission for the out years as it relates to the POM?

The evaluation of the research evidence will first determine if the institutions are preparing officers to meet the doctrinal requirements, making them functional in force management assignments. If this is not the case, then it will be reported as such. Results of the survey, both quantitative and qualitative will be reported, staying clear of threats to validity by the researcher.

Summary

The objective of the research is to determine how well the Army prepares its force managers to be functional officers upon assignment. The research will only look at the development and training aspects of the Army Imperatives and the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model as depicted in the analytical model earlier in this chapter. The analytical plan will examine the applicable doctrine for division, corps, and ASCC as it reviews and analyzes the programs of instruction from four Army institutions. This detailed analysis in conjunction with the survey of a selected population will provide the Army with data that will help in sustaining its training program or improving it to better prepare its force managers for functional assignments.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Force management is a very difficult and complicated set of cyclical and iterative processes that can easily evoke apprehension and frustration in those thinking about becoming involved. In force management, the desire for quick returns in structure changes is termed in years rather than months. An attempt to understand it all almost always guarantees vexation. The adverse impact from the lack of understanding, however, exceeds even the constant hassle and frustrations. Reading about force management will not help in understanding the numerous processes involved in it. Consequently, for simplicity, this research focused at ASCC level and below, using doctrine as the means to analyze what level of functionality Army institutions provide to force managers.

The methodology described and explained in chapter 3, proved adequate for analysis and inferences during the conduct of this research. The researcher set out to review available doctrine applicable to organizations at ASCC level and below. The research focused on specific tasks, responsibilities, or functions that must be performed relative to force management. Once identified, the force management tasks or functions were categorized into tasks or functions that corresponded to requests for change, force integration, POM, CPLAN, or TAA.

Doctrinal Analysis

To ensure all applicable doctrine was considered, the process began with capstone doctrine, FM 1, *The Army*, followed by keystone, key integrating, and branch-principle

level doctrine. Capstone doctrine is the overarching doctrine that sets the foundation for all other Army doctrine. It focuses on Army core competencies and “six imperatives” (U.S. DA 2001b, 27) that ensure the Army maintains a ready force while developing needed future capabilities.

Capstone Doctrine

A review of capstone doctrine revealed the importance of having educated, trained personnel, either officer, warrant officer or noncommissioned officer. It acknowledges that officers must be able to withstand the increasing demands within their fields. To this end, officers must continuously seek leader development at all levels of the Army. FM 1 states, such developmental commitment is essential towards the “life long” commitment of “learning” (U.S. DA 2001b, 29). Capstone doctrine in FM 1 additionally highlights the need to be effective though not only in training, but also in education and leader development to ensure the Army is ready to “organize, equip, and train” soldiers to “fight and win” when directed by our leaders (U.S. DA 2001b, 29, 21). To keep up with such demand, force managers must have the knowledge, background, and expertise at “developing and fielding the right kind of force when facing continued technological advancements and changes in the strategic environment, which is a momentous challenge” (U.S. DA 2001b, 33).

Keystone Doctrine

The next level of doctrine reviewed was keystone doctrine. Keystone doctrine is established in FM 3-0, *Operations*. It provides direction to commanders and trainers at all echelons from battalion to corps, enabling curricula to be developed to meet training and educational needs within the Army educational system. The span of application enables

key integrating doctrine to be developed from battalion to corps using supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures. FM 3-0 states that within the field of force management, “the Army must maintain the structure and expertise necessary to develop, acquire, and supply the equipment and supplies for full spectrum operations” (U.S. DA 2001c, 1-7). This assertion demands that Army personnel not only the complete knowledge to structure Army organizations to conduct full spectrum operations, but also to be able to maintain the needed force structure for the future. Having this knowledge will ensure that the Army’s requirements and its existence is justified, understood, and funded through the POM. Maintenance of Army structure and expertise will serve as a criterion for analysis when reviewing institutional education. It will also allow for inferences on the ability to have or obtain the required functional proficiency.

Key Integrating Doctrine

Four manuals constituted the review of key integrating doctrine. The final draft of FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, which is replacing FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations* when approved for print, delineates the required tasks for an operations staff concerning force management. The manual applies to the Army tactical echelon of command up to corps. This manual emphasizes the fundamentals of command and control. At Table 1 are the expectations of the operations officer (G3 or S3), battalion through corps. The table provides tasks and responsibilities that are specific to force management. It is fitting to note and assume that such requirements are intended for the force management officer who works for the operations officer (G3/S3) of a division, corps, or ASCC. Though the manual does not specifically recognize the force management officer, it is assumed based on assignment that the force

Table 1. Force Management Tasks and Responsibilities from Key Integrating Doctrine.

Approved Final Draft FM 6.0	FM 101-5
Total Army Analysis	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop and recommend a planned or programmed force structure. • Evaluate the organizational structure, functions, and workload of military and civilian personnel to ensure their proper use and requirements (manpower utilization and requirements). • Allocate manpower resources to subordinate commands within established ceilings and guidance (manpower allocation). • Plan and conduct formal, on-site manpower and equipment surveys. • Record and report data for information, planning and programming, allocation, and justification (manpower reports). • Determine qualitative and quantitative personnel requirements for new equipment and systems. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reviewing, analyzing, and recommending a planned or programmed force structure. • Evaluating the organizational structure, functions, and workload of military and civilian personnel to ensure their proper use and requirements (manpower utilization and requirements). • Allocating manpower resources to subordinate commands within established ceilings and guidance (manpower allocation). • Planning and conducting formal, on-site manpower and equipment surveys. • Recording and reporting data for information, planning and programming, allocation, and justification (manpower reports). • Determine qualitative and quantitative personnel requirements for new equipment and systems.
Command Plan	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Process procedures for unit activation, inactivation, establishment, discontinuance, and reorganization (force accounting). • Ensure MTDA and MTOE documents reflect the minimum essential and most economical equipment needed to accomplish the assigned mission. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Processing procedures for unit activation, inactivation, establishment, discontinuance, and reorganization (force accounting). • Ensuring MTDA and MTOE documents reflect the minimum-essential and most-economical equipment needed to accomplish the assigned mission.
Request for Change	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop and revise unit force data for documenting any changes to the MTOE and modification table of distribution and allowances (MTDA). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developing and revising unit force data for documenting any changes to the MTOE and modification table of distribution and allowances (MTDA).
Program Objective Memorandum	
Force Integration	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Field new weapons and equipment systems (force modernization). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fielding new weapons and equipment systems (force modernization).

Source: (U.S. DA 2002, D-17) (U.S. DA 1997b, 4-13)

management officer is the one who would be expected to perform the specified force management doctrinal tasks. When the tasks and responsibilities were categorized, it was found that commands through corps must be able to effect changes, integrate systems, prepare for the command plan, and prepare for TAA. This manual however, does not mention POM preparation, as it may be viewed as a function of the next level of command, either the MACOM or ASCC.

FM 3-90, *Tactics*, is key integrating doctrine that brings together the science and art used to employ systems and organizations together to achieve a designated purpose. In its entirety, the manual addresses the actions commanders take to “arrange units and activities in relation to each other and the enemy” (U.S. DA 2001d, xiii). Though this manual is tactics heavy, it does acknowledge that the Army will be fielded “new equipment as initial brigade combat teams as prototypes for what is yet to come, the objective force” (U.S. DA 2001d, A-3). This acknowledgement is a testament to the level of force management knowledge force managers need to effect change and integrate multiple systems in one place to multiple units of various disciplines. Consequently diminishing command concern over integration, liberating the commanders and allowing them to organize as best fit for battles or engagements.

As part of the key integrating doctrine, draft FM 3-93, *Army in Theater Operations*, was reviewed in a similar way as the previous two manuals. Draft FM 3-93 is designed to guide ASCC commanders and staff. The manual addresses the ASCC in a theater environment, describing organization, planning, and operations in a theater. As it addresses organization and operations, this manual specifically identifies the responsibilities of force management in an ASCC. These responsibilities are found in

appendix A of the field manual. It states that the deputy chief of staff operations is “the principal staff assistant to the commander in matters pertaining to command and control, OPSEC, force structure, force management” (U.S. DA 2001e, A-14). Additionally, as a subelement or branch of the G3, the manual specifies:

FORCE MANAGEMENT AND READINESS BRANCH/PD/OPS/MN: Plans and oversees force modernization and combat developments. Reviews army, joint, and combined concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Provides policy guidance in the fielding of new equipment. Provides guidance, coordination and supervision of command Individual Concern and Deficiency (ICAD) issues IAW JP1- 03.31. Consolidates input from staff sections and forwards for inclusion in the CINC's Preparedness Assessment Report (CSPAR). (U.S. DA 2001e, A-14)

This is the first field manual that addresses force management as a functioning element of the staff with specific duties under the G3. Previously, staff position responsibilities for force management functions were assumed since responsibility was not listed below the G3/S3.

The categorization of responsibilities found in FM 3-93 determined that this manual addresses functions applying to the building of the POM and activities relating to force integration. Conversely, unlike FM 101-5 or FM 6-0, specified responsibilities do not delineate functions that involve effecting change using DA 2028 or preparing either the CPLAN or TAA.

Branch-Principle Doctrine

Branch principle doctrine is written by branches to aid their organizations in the execution of tactical operations. Only one branch-principle level doctrinal manual was found and reviewed: FM 100-11, *Force Integration*. FM 100-11 is an explanation of force management and its different processes. FM 100-11 is useful for understanding force management. To someone seeking knowledge or understanding of force

management, this manual provides a non-technical explanation of processes and linkage to the Army Life Cycle Model. Additionally, the manual serves as a reference for terms not common in everyday Army language. Unfortunately, FM 100-11 does not provide the how-to at any Army level. When compared in content to other branch-principle doctrine, it was found that FM 100-11 lacks the same level of detail.

There are some primers that are available on the Army Force Management School Internet homepage that explain force management, PPBES and TAA, but they serve to explain the systems and processes with no “how-to” procedures for every level of command. Although not a doctrinal manual, the Army War College publishes a 2 1/2 inch thick handbook that explains in great detail the various force management processes. Similar to FM 100-11 and the pamphlets from the Army Force Management School, the Army War College *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook*, does not provide the how-to for every level of command. When compared to FM 100-11, the handbook is redundant in explaining the various processes.

Analysis of available doctrine indicates that force management techniques and procedures are limited at best, not providing every level of command from division to ASCC what force managers need to know or to do to integrate into the various processes of force management. This void in guidance, techniques, and procedures prevents organizations or units from effecting change or being effectively involved in the process. Having completed a review of doctrine, the researcher segued to the review of programs of instructions from the Army War College, Command and General Staff College, Army Logistics Management College, and the Army Force Management School.

Army Institutions

Of the Professional Military Education (PME) institutions, two schools were selected for research: the Army War College and the Command and General Staff College. The other two schools--the Army Logistics Management College, Army Force Management School--were selected based on the force management curriculum that is currently taught to Army officers.

What the institutions teach is what will be covered later. It is noteworthy to mention that when the term force management is used, it purports detail of all the various force management processes and the how-to at every level, though the opposite was found during the research. Following are the research findings for each of the schools.

The Army War College

The Army War College is a Department of the Army board-selected attended institution. Selected Army officers in the grade of lieutenant colonel and colonel attend this residence course for 10 months. Of all the content taught at the Army War College, force management is one of the many electives that are available to students. The scope of the force management elective is listed below:

Force Management, in the broadest sense, is the management of change in the U.S. Army. It is the capstone process of the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model (AOLCM). Force Management processes examined in this elective include Requirements Determination; Concept Development; Total Army Analysis; Combat Developments; Research, Development, and Acquisition; across the domains of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership Development, Materiel, Personnel and Facilities (DOTLMPF); and documentation. The course will examine systems and processes, key players, and their interaction that allow the Army to design organizations and manage change all within available resources and ultimately providing mission-ready forces for the combatant commanders. The course will comprise seminar sessions, directed study, a practical exercise/case study, field trip and student presentations. Seminar sessions will include

presentations by the faculty and guests who are intimately knowledgeable of the detailed aspects of force management processes. (Thomas 2003)

The force management elective is but one of twenty-eight electives taught by the War College from *How the Army Runs, A Senior Leader Reference Handbook*. The force management elective consists of thirty contact hours. In the thirty hours, the students are provided with an overview of the many force management processes as described in the scope above, providing familiarity and understanding. It is important to note the level of detail taught in thirty hours of contact does not reach the how-to necessary to initiate actions at division, corps, or ASCC for any of the processes described in the scope of the elective. Additionally, it is noteworthy to restate that not everyone gets the opportunity to attend the War College, so those officers that do not get selected will not have an opportunity to understanding force management and the many processes that it entails. Further, attendance at the War College does not necessarily mean that students will sign up for the elective, resulting in officers departing with the same knowledge of force management as when they arrived.

The Command and General Staff College

The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) is also a Department of the Army board-selected attended institution. Currently about 50 percent of each year group has the opportunity to attend the resident course. Those officers who are not selected for resident attendance must enroll and complete the course via correspondence. Theoretically, all officers will receive the same education. Concerning resident students only, CGSC is divided into two parts. The first part is a core curriculum where everyone gets the same instruction consisting of the five areas listed below:

1. Fundamentals of Warfighting (tactics at brigade, division, and corps)

2. Resource Planning and Force Management
3. Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting (joint and multinational operations)
4. History
5. Leadership

The second part of CGSC is all Advanced Application Programs (AAPs), where the students receive focused education in the form of electives that are relevant to their specific branch.

The core course of CGSC that is being reviewed is Resource Planning and Force Management. This core course is divided into seven five-hour lessons that focus on the force development aspect of force management. The content covers the art of extracting concepts from a vision toward the creation of an organization that can be tested, procured and fielded. The majority of the instruction for Resource Planning and Force Management are on functions a combat developer performs at Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) level. Students are taken through the acquisition process of how the Army obtains equipment for the field. Students are introduced to terminology and a process that is foreign, then tested, followed by the practical experience of in- and out-of-class exercises. The force management processes is taught mainly using the handbook, *How the Army Runs*. Throughout the course, students are provided a broad explanation of some of the force management processes such as TAA and the POM. At the conclusion of the course in lesson seven, a guest speaker is brought in to explain how the many processes of force management enable the Army to run. However, at closure students depart with an understanding primarily of the acquisition process. Students are not taught how to effect change at the division, corps, and ASCC level. Students in general,

including force managers, are not empowered with the knowledge of how to effect change at their units using DA Form 2028. They are not taught how to use the Command Plan to realign units, or how to go about using the TAA process for any new requirements.

The Army Logistics Management College

The Army Logistics Management College offers many courses that vary from one week to sixteen weeks tailored for personnel in the logistics field. Analysis identified two courses as providing content about force management. First, the Logistics Executive Development Course (LEDC) is a sixteen week developmental course that provides some force management understanding to leaders in logistics management positions. As already stated, attendance is limited primarily to senior logisticians, either military or civilian. The second course reviewed was the Manpower and Force Management Course, which offers more force management material than any other course. An additional requirement for attendance is expected assignment in a logistics position.

Specific requirements for LEDC include the completion or attendance of college level work. The course does note that preference for attendance is given to Combat Service Support (CSS) officers. “Those officers considering attendance must have one of the following specialties: 15D, 51, 53, 67, or specialties numbered 4 through 97 as described in Army Regulation 611-101. Officers must be branch qualified and have graduated from CAS3” (ALMC 2001). Officer attendance is at the discretion of his or her branch assignment officer who initiates the attendance process. In the course of nine modules, the following scope is achieved:

LEDC serves as the Army's senior logistics course to prepare civilian and military managers for key executive positions within the Army and DOD logistics systems, to broaden the individual's logistics foundation developed by earlier logistics functional courses and personal experience, to provide insights into the multifunctional areas of logistics and their integration into the overall DOD logistics system, to expand and enhance the fundamental management skills of the individual, and to provide an understanding of the interface between the Army in the field, the logistics structure, and industry. The course of instruction includes financial management; manpower and force management; acquisition management; integrated logistics support; decision sciences; materiel readiness, to include physical distribution, inventory management, major/secondary items, CCSS; depot operations; transportation; environment considerations; reutilization disposal systems; developing logistics strategy; logistics military history, managerial economics; and theater logistics. (ALMC 2001)

A review of the program of instruction for LEDC revealed that concerning force management, there are total of three hours of instruction that explain the PPBS process and describes its relationship to the major command's POM. In one of the modules, manpower management is also covered in four hours, which addresses the documentation process as it relates to unit readiness and manpower requirements. To gain an understanding, the program of instruction called for a practical exercise. For the content taught at LEDC, it can be deduced that in the seven hours of instruction, little can be attained in regards to application at the division, corps, and ASCC level. With regards to force management, students attending LEDC will have an appreciation of the PPBS process at the major command level. Additionally, they gain an understanding of how documentation impacts unit readiness and the analysis needed to determine manpower requirements.

The Manpower and Force Management Course offered by ALMC requires that nominees be assigned to a position that requires a knowledge of manpower and force management skills. This course is offered to noncommissioned officers and officers alike, to include civilians. The course is two weeks in length with a scope as listed below.

The curriculum concentrates on manpower and force management functions. The subject areas covered during the manpower blocks of instruction are tailored to the manpower management functions described in AR 570-4 and AR 71-32. These functions address the fundamental aspects of planning and programming, requirements determination with emphasis on the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency, 12-Step Method, Civilian Employment Plans (CELP), Centralized Documentation (CENDOC), Civilian Manpower Integrated Costing Systems (CMICS), Total Army Analysis (TAA), Total Asset Visibility (TAV), allocation process, analysis and evaluation. The force management subject areas address the fundamental aspects of force management: developing, manning, and equipping the force. The course includes student introduction to the automated system, knowledge on demand (KOD), to manage dollars and civilian personnel, as directed by ASA-MR&A. Lastly, HQDA automated manpower management information systems and current force structure issues are discussed. (ALMC 2001)

The two-week Manpower and Force Management Course is very aggressive and at best provides an overview. The overview is focused on civilian personnel management, understanding of TAA, and the various aspects of force management with respect to developing, manning, and equipping the force. Due to its short length, an in-depth how-to instruction is not achievable. Consequently, the course settles for an introduction, an overview, and an understanding of instructional material.

The Army Force Management School

The Army Force Management School is a Department of the Army, G3-sponsored school on contract to teach force management. The school uses branch-principle level doctrine, FM 100-11, as one of the reference documents along with the handbook published by the Army War College, *How the Army Runs*. Additionally, the school uses current force management processes in progress for developmental understanding and explanation, along with applicable regulations to support the lessons plans, adding reality to the overall course content. The target audience includes officers, captain through colonel, and civilians who are working in or are going to a force management position. Attendance at this course is left up to the unit or the appropriate Army staff agency.

Officers selected into the institutional career field with a force management functional area of 50 will attend this course as a requirement for knowledge and advancement. The course scope claims, “Upon completion of the course, students will be better prepared to assume a mid-level management position within any functional area of force management” (Camp 2003). The force management core course asserts further that “the overall course is designed to educate and train military and civilian personnel with the ‘why’ and ‘how-to’ of determining force requirements and alternative means of resourcing in order to accomplish Army functions and missions” (Camp 2003).

The course curriculum and terminal learning objectives are very aggressive. It covers content as shown below in Table 2, which easily overwhelms those that are new to force management. The course provides insight into how the Army runs by explaining how the Army is resourced and the many Army and Department of Defense processes that lead to a justified, resourced, budgeted, and congressionally funded Army.

As part of the force management course, two one-week subcourses are available to provide the student with an in-depth appreciation of either disciplines, the Combat Developer/Materiel Developer (CD/MD) course or the Force Developer (FD) course using the practical experience method of learning. Additionally, the subcourses are also designed to provide students a thorough awareness of each of the disciplines. “The Force Developer (FD) subcourse for instance is a force integration case study.

The FD subcourse presents the framework for affordability, supportability, and executability evaluations of force design options. The case study is designed with 40 hours dedicated for student groups to develop and present solutions using both personal experience and material learned in the program of instruction” (Camp 2003).

Table 2. The Army Force Management School Core Course Content

- “Why Force Management”
- Title X, Roles, Functions and Missions
- Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
- Reserve Components (RC)
- Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)
- Planning, Programming and Budget System (PPBS)
- Today’s Army and Force XXI
- Army Vision
- Army Transformation
- Force Development Overview
- Combat Developer / Materiel Developer (CD/MD) Overview
- Organization Design and Development
- Manpower Requirements
- Planning, Programming, Budget Execution System (PPBES)
- Total Army Analysis (TAA)
- PPBES: Programming
- PPBES: Budgeting and Execution
- Army Flow Model (AFM)
- Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS)
- Military and Civilian Manpower
- The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS), Structure and Composition System (SACS) and Force Builder (FB)
- Manning the Force (Enlisted)
- Manning the Force (Officer)
- Human Dimensions of Transformation
- Army Modernization Training
- Equipping the Force
- Stationing the Force
- Force Readiness

Source: James T. Camp, 2003. Force Management Core Course Description and Scope. Online. The Army Force Management School. Cited 28 February 2003. Available from <http://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil/main.html>.

At completion of the course, the students are expected to be familiar with Army organizational roles, functions and missions at the MACOM and Army staff level.

Analysis of this course reveals that due to its aggressiveness and nature of the content, students are overwhelmed by trying to understand all the material. As previously

stated, the instruction is focused at the MACOM and DA level, helping students understand what is going on around them within the confines of the Department, while providing familiarity with unfamiliar terminology. Undoubtedly, the course provides all of the aspects of force management discussed in FM 100-11 and the handbook, *How the Army Runs*. There is some similarity between the AFMS content and the other three institutions whose POI contents were reviewed. The AFMS instruction similarly does not provide the “how-to” at the division, corps, or ASCC level so it can be integrated into the Department level process. While graduating students may have some understanding at the strategic level, they do not have the ability or the knowledge on how to effect change at the operational and tactical level. Resources provided by AFMS are superb as references for clarification or understanding of the many Army force management processes. Unfortunately, the AFMS force management course leaves much to be desired for force managers concerning tactics, techniques, procedures, and the how-to required at ASCC level and below.

Results of Analysis

Analysis of doctrine and Army institutions revealed three results. First, there is confusion in specific terminology when it comes to force management, force development, and force modernization. To the layperson, such terms are nothing more than semantics. To the force manager, force development, and force modernization are subsets of force management, clearly recognizing that force management is the capstone process for the establishment and fielding of mission ready forces.

Second, doctrine about force management is available at every level. However, it is inconsistent from the capstone level through the branch-principle level. While some

manuals identified force management responsibilities, such as FM 101-5 and FM 3-93, others only made mention of some functions of force management. Similarly, it was found that FM 100-11 explains the many processes of force management, but it does not provide the responsibilities of the force managers or the how-to at division, corps, or ASCC level.

Third, it is obvious that the reviewed institutions do teach force management or some form of it. However, even with regards to the limited force management doctrine in Field Manuals 101-5 and 3-93, Army institutions are not providing the how-to of achieving the stated tasks as part of their curriculums that would allow students to effect change at the division, corps, or ASCC level. In fact, the War College elective, the AFMS force management course, and in some regards CGSC, teach the same material at the same level--strategic.

Survey Results

The conduct of a survey was part of the methodology for this research. The survey was intended to provide both quantitative and qualitative feedback. The population consisted of force management officers who were in force management positions at divisions, corps, and ASCCs. While the survey was approved and delivered in a timely manner, not everyone was able to respond primarily for two reasons. First, at the division level, the authorized positions are not all filled with Army officers. It was found that civilians were hired to fill the slots and perform required force management functions. Second, due to the deployment of forces to the Middle East region some officers did not provide a response. However, some analysis could still be made of those that responded. Outlined below are some of the findings from the respondents.

1. When asked if CGSC prepared them for their current job as a force manager, five of seven of those who attended CGSC disagreed; two responded as neither agreed nor disagreed.
2. There were no officers that attended the War College among the respondents; as such, no data was collected.
3. There were four officers who attended ALMC. All agreed that attendance prepared them for their current job as a force manager.
4. When asked if attendance to the AFMS force management course prepared them for their current job, 15 percent strongly agreed, 54 percent agreed, 15 percent disagreed, and 7 percent strongly disagreed; one did not respond.
5. When asked if the institutional education they received prepared them as force managers, 36 percent agreed, 21 percent neither agreed nor disagreed, and 43 percent disagreed.
6. When asked if after completing the force management school, they were effective in the execution of their duties upon arrival to their first force management job, 28 percent agreed, 28 percent neither agreed nor disagreed, 28 percent disagreed, and 14 percent strongly disagreed.

Of the qualitative data collected, listed below are some of the comments provided and attached at appendix D. When asked in retrospect, what training they wished they had prior to assignment as a force manager, one respondent replied:

The Force Management Course really needs to prepare Division-level Force Integration officers--which means they need to spend more time teaching officers about the force modernization process (it is not fun, it can be boring and tedious--but it really impacts training in a division). Additionally, the course needs to focus or at least address Command Plans. I never heard of a command plan until I arrived at my first assignment.

The MAM (material acquisition management) course is a good background for the force mod process--it helped me as a division FI officer much more than the 50 course at Belvoir.

Another respondent stated:

The Army Force Management School, while an excellent course and the best I've ever attended while in the Army, it wasn't that relevant to what a force manager will do in a Division or Corps level job. I learned my Corps-level job while in my first Force Management assignment. Upon returning to the Corps level, I was very prepared. As an additional note, understanding digitization when working in III Corps is, perhaps, the bigger challenge.

Yet another respondent stated:

The training at the Force Management School did not really discuss what was expected from the force managers at the division, corps, or ASCC levels. It was primarily focused on the kind of work performed up in DC.

When asked based on your experience is there any specific training that you would recommend towards the preparation of future force managers; one responded stated:

Specific training on each of the Force Management functions (Doctrine, Training, Organizational, Materiel, and Combat development), the Force Development Process (Generate Requirements, Design Organizations Develop Organizational Models, Determine Organization Authorizations and Documentation of Organizational Authorizations), Total Army Analysis (TAA), Planning, Programming and Budgeting System, and Total Army Analysis. The AFMS or the few hours given in GCSC are not enough to develop us into well rounded FA50 officers. We receive too much in too little time and training is too broad.

Another respondent claimed:

Yes, force management school is a must but several topics must be expounded on to improve our effectiveness at the corps and division level. Fielding equipment process and making changes to system's architectures and MTOE changes.

A third respondent asserted even further:

This is tough. Based on the ODP (as I understand it) there are not many ODP-supported positions for FA50s in the Corps & Divisions. Therefore, it would not "pay" to train FA50s to do the corps and division functions. The Army Force Management Course

does provide a background on these functions, but it is presented at the Army (macro) level. At the division and corps (micro) level, the actions and tasks you must undertake are different. I think it is very important for a Force Manager to understand digitization and the ABCS systems. If you think about it, almost anywhere, understanding digitization is critical. No one teaches it, you learn it balancing on the pointy end of the spear!

Relevance to Future Force Managers

First, it must be recognized that knowledge of force management and the many processes is critical in being functional, and effective in order to effect change. To effect change, new force management officers must have the basics for being functional and effective at the lower echelons of command. At division level, there may only be one force management officer; maybe two at corps. There is an expectation that these officers know what force managers need to do. As discussed above, while there is instruction provided at Army institutions, it needs to be more focused and applicable. There are certain tasks that a force manager needs to know at the division and corps level that are different at the ASCC.

Second, in order to prevent discovery learning, institutions must provide the basics to those force management officers going to divisions, corps, and ASCCs. There is less experience on knowing the how-to at these levels than at the Department level. This assertion is made on the basis that the majority of civilian positions in force management are found at the Pentagon rather than divisions, corps, and ASCCs. It is apparent that force management entails a lot and it is not possible to learn it all on one tour. Providing relevant training and education will go a long way toward providing functional and effective force managers to the field.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

In summary, force management is the Army's capstone process used to field combat ready units. It involves many processes that are initiated at various places and involve every organization. To understand how the Army runs is to know force management. Consequently, because of the magnitude of processes, force management is not readily nor easily grasped and accepted across the Army. Those not familiar with it will become frustrated, calling it bureaucratic because of its slow developmental process. However, the opposite may be true. The force management process systematically ensures coherent, reasonable justifications toward the fielding of units that make up the Army.

Why is force management significant? This question was answered in chapter 1 and will be summarized again for clarity. First, as the Army continues to transform, the need for force management knowledgeable officers who can answer the tough questions will become even more demanding. Questions like: How can organizations change?; When is the right time for processing changes?; How do we activate or inactivate organization?; will need answers. There are many implications for Army force structure that may result, some that may not be recognized until it is too late or not within the force management cycle to deal with them appropriately. Lack of action will be captured as lessons learned, but when a new force manager is assigned, there is potential for these omissions to be made all over again. Second, a review of what is taught to force

managers can provide, or at a minimum, suggest the initiation of a needs analysis into the training and education of force managers who are going to divisions, corps, and ASCCs. In the upcoming years, and beyond the objective force, it will be force managers who will not only design and resource the Army, but actually integrate it at its lowest levels. Such knowledge and abilities will free commanders and operations officers of such details, allowing them to refine employment of troops, enhancing war-fighting skills.

Conclusion

Education can be provided through many methods of instruction, including practical experience that increase knowledge and proficiency, and simulations that increase reality. No one method is any better than the other as long as the instruction reaches all the senses. However, when it comes to content, education becomes a challenge. Educational institutions can only teach so much content within limited time resources. Institutions and instructors must have the necessary background and knowledge to be able to teach the content. When content, time, and method of instruction are not in harmony, the content's level of detail becomes the victim of constrained resources. Consequently, the content results in general understanding of a lot of general material imparted in a short time span.

The analysis in chapter 4 revealed that of the four institutions reviewed, time and content were at odds. Accordingly, content was reduced to an introduction, examination, review, and understanding of terms or processes at the macro level only. The how-to at every level was unavailable from the programs of instruction. Students receive an introduction and general understanding, rather than detailed application at all levels. Relevance is questionable at CGSC and AFMS based on the review of programs of

instruction. Interestingly, a comment captured during the Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study revealed a similar comment: “The quality and relevance of the Officer Education System of instruction from the Officer Basic Course through CGSOC does not meet the expectations of many officers” (U.S. DA 2001a).

Some doctrine is available for the force management officer. However, the analysis in chapter 4 revealed inconsistencies at each of the levels of doctrine. Some manuals addressed specific responsibilities, while others addressed force management in a vague and general manner. The researcher could speculate as to the reasons, such as the writer being unfamiliar with force management and how it impacts unit readiness and as a result omitting it all together. The reasons for these inconsistencies could be the subject for other research.

Answer the Thesis Question

The primary question related to the topic of this thesis is: Does the Army adequately train its force managers to make them functional at the division, corps, and Army Service component command level staffs?

Based on analysis of POIs and feedback from the survey conducted, it can be concluded that while Army institutions are providing excellent training and education, the Army does not adequately train its force managers to make them functional at division, corps, and ASCC level. Hence, some improvement needs to be made to make force managers functional at the division, corps, and ASCC. Current instruction needs to be increased, and provide methods, tactics, techniques, procedures to include basic “how-to” at levels that are relevant to the first assignment. While it is true that the best training is at the unit as you learn from your peers and supervisors, this assertion does not ring true for

force managers at the three levels being researched and analyzed. For example, at the division there may only be one authorization for a force manager, thus no peers are available from whom to learn force management. Further, supervisors may be in a similar situation, lacking knowledge on force management functions. A review of CGSC and the War College POIs showed that instruction was on force development applicable at the Department level at CGSC, and similarly not relevant to a person going to a divisional assignment at the War College. In essence, the force management officer is left to his or her own devices to learn the substance of the functional area. Concluding that going directly to the unit expecting to learn from peers or supervisors is a false assumption.

Secondary Questions

To assist in the research process, several secondary questions entailed review of all available Army doctrine and Army institutions. These questions set the path for the collection of data and the initiation of a survey.

The first question asked: What training does the Army provide institutionally on force management for divisional, corps or ASCC level staff officers? The Army does provide training institutionally. It provides an understanding of the many processes that make up force management. The content taught by different institutions varies. For example, the Army Force Management School covers all aspects of force management in two weeks, followed by two one-week practical experience exercises drawing on personal experience and content learned in the course. Surveyed officers gave high marks to this school characterizing it as challenging from day one until graduation. The AFMS provided information on processes students had not known of or did not know even existed. The training provided by the AFMS placed all force management processes in

perspective. Similarly, students at the War College are provided the same level of detail, providing the students with the reality of how the Army runs. As part of the curriculum, students review an event where the force management process did not work, and are tasked to provide the right fix using learned material. For new field grades who attend CGSC, students are introduced to force development and how the Army process works at obtaining equipment and organizations from the time a requirement is determined. In seven five-hour lessons, students demonstrate their understanding using the practical experience to apply learned content. At the conclusion, students walk away with an understanding primarily of the acquisition process and how organizations are created for the Army. Personnel in the combat service support arena have the Army Logistics Management College courses: the Logistics Executive Development Course (LEDC) and the Manpower and Force Management Course. LEDC is offered to personnel who have an actual or anticipated follow-on assignment in a managerial position in logistics and have completed some college level work previously. The Manpower and Force Management Course is offered to personnel assigned to a position requiring knowledge or use of manpower and force management skills. The two week course focuses on civilian management, introducing Total Army Analysis as it relates to manpower. In the force management portion, the course addresses the fundamental aspects of force management: developing, manning, and equipping the force as an overview of functions.

The second question asked: Which institutions provide training and education in force management? To answer this question a review of the Army's professional military education systems was conducted and analysis determined that there were four institutions that taught force management in some form, though only two were part of the

professional military education system. Curriculum was documented in the form of programs of instruction and could be analyzed in detail for time spent on subject matter and hands-on application. To this end, the Army War College, the Command and General Staff College, the Army Logistics Management College and the Army Force Management School were selected for analysis.

The third secondary question asked: What do force managers need to know in force management for each level of command: division, corps, and ASCC? The answer to this question could only be found in doctrine. A detailed review of all field manuals needed to be conducted. Since the focus was limited to division, corps, and ASCC, manuals were reviewed accordingly. Initial research, revealed that divisional and corps branch-principle level doctrine did not address force management. At the ASCC level, however, FM 3-93 recognized the force management branch as part of the ASCC staff and provided initial responsibilities. Short on detail, FM 3-93 still provided some information on the requirement to conduct TAA and POM type functions. It was not until key integrating doctrine was reviewed that responsibilities were first addressed. Both final draft FM 6-0 and FM 101-5 similarly specified responsibilities that could help identify what force managers needed to know. Reviews of keystone and capstone doctrine revealed that guidance was too general and only provided recognition of the force management function.

Recommendation

There are several recommendations that came out of this research. First, improvements are needed to ensure training and education is provided to officers going to division, corps, and ASCC level force management assignments. Moreover, the training

and education provided must be relevant to their assignments. Currently, it is not clear as to who should teach force managers the how-to of the functional area. It was evident in the reviews of POIs that if force management is taught, it is all being done from a macro perspective, with little application at the lower levels. The method of instruction is not at question as to preparedness of functional force managers, but rather time and content. Consideration needs to be given to those officers that are selected for the force management functional area. These officers come in with limited knowledge regarding force management. If force management was about leadership alone or in general, force managers would not have problems. But force management requires new knowledge and understanding of the many processes that provide ready units to the Army. It is up to the institution to provide them the tools and methods for them to be functional upon arrival at their first force management assignment. Consider the twelve-month Command Plan process. Qualitative survey results revealed that it takes new force managers up to six months to understand what they need to do; this puts them behind in the cycle and slows down the process at their level, simply because the process does not slow down at the Department level. Consequently, unit readiness is impacted later on because the Command Plan process was not done right. It is not about knowing where to get information on force management, but about obtaining information that is useful and relevant to their current force management position and tasks.

Second, to improve or sustain proficiency, a digital Internet knowledge base should be considered for development where force managers could access tactics, techniques and procedures that are adaptable to their local needs. The research has shown that since doctrine is limited, there is no mission training plan that can be used to measure

performance or knowledge at the division, corps, and ASCC level. Some direction is provided by the limited doctrine available, but absent is the how-to, which is what is needed at the tactical and operational level of force management at division, corps, and ASCC.

Third, improve the doctrine at every level: branch-principle, key integrating, keystone, and capstone; incorporate doctrinal tasks and tailor them to the appropriate command level. This will enable the development of mission training plans for the multiple force management processes.

The instruction reviewed from all four Army institutions was properly programmed. It provided understanding of the many force management processes, but is tailored at the Department level. It does not provide the how-to to be relevant to the needs of the officer, as opposed to the level of education of the institution. Consider having division, corps, and ASCC personnel provide their knowledge to new personnel by bringing them in as guest speakers to share their experiences.

Create a knowledge base that allows all divisions to improve and understand the how-to. In the knowledge base, list tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as lessons learned. The total force management population is small enough and should be manageable. The Army has a limited number of divisions, corps, and ASCCs. Force managers across the Army echelons should be doing the same work respective to their echelon, perhaps briefed and tailored differently for their respective commanders. Overall, methods and approach should be the same. The force management process has not changed substantially over the years, just the people.

Instead of everyone teaching the same thing at the same level, develop a course that addresses current Army force management officer's needs and requirements. Additionally, this thesis only questions Army force management. What about Joint force management? There are force management officers filling joint billets. Who is responsible for preparing them in the force management joint world? This could also benefit new civilians who are entering the force management field.

Final Thoughts

FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, purports that “institutional training is critical in developing leaders and preparing them for increased positions of responsibility throughout the Army. The Army school system provides formal education and training for job related . . . skills” (U.S. DA 1999, 5-14). It is imperative then that the education and training of future officers who are selected into the institutional career field be reconsidered, especially in the force management field. Though not thorough, FM 3-93, FM 101-5, and similarly draft FM 6-0, provide staff responsibilities for force managers. Stated doctrine provides the basis for institutions to do a needs analysis to ensure officers being assigned to divisions, corps, and ASCCs are given the proper training and education to be functional and effective. Force management does not need to be discovery learning at division, corps, and ASCC. The Army has existing professional institutions that are very capable of teaching the tasks of force management. These institutions just need refinement and more time to teach force management, providing instruction that is relevant to the force management officer's assignment with the goal of providing developmental training as discussed in the Army imperatives in FM 1, *The Army*.

APPENDIX A

OPMS XXI

Career Fields from OPMS XXI

The Operations Career Field (OP CF) supports organizational units with officers qualified by training, education, and experience in Army operations. It is composed of officers in the Army's current 16 branches and two functional areas, FA 39 (Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs) and FA 90 (Multifunctional Logisticians). Officers in this CF will retain a functional area for the remainder of their careers, even if they never serve in it. The functional area will identify special aptitudes and skills that may provide flexibility for future duty assignments at the field-grade level.

The Information Operations (IO) CF responds to the requirements of the 21st Century's Information Age. The IO CF brings together related disciplines with associated functional areas and creates several new ones. The officers within this CF, as with the other specialty career fields of Institutional Support and Operational Support, continue with table of organization and equipment (TOE) and table of distribution and allowance (TDA) assignments across the Army performing a wide variety of IO missions and tasks.

The functional areas in this CF are FA 24 (Information Systems Engineering), FA 30 (Information Operations), FA 34 (Strategic Intelligence), FA 40 (Space Operations), FA 46 (Public Affairs), FA 53 (Information Systems Management), and FA 57 (Simulations Operations). Note that Functional Areas 30, 34, 40, and 57 are new FAs.

The Institutional Support (IS) CF focuses on the increasingly technical and complex nature of running the Army as an organization. The emphasis in this CF is


management, planning and programming of Army resources, both near-term and into the future by projecting requirements and developing capabilities in the mid- and long-term. The Functional Areas in this CF are FA 43 (Human Resource Management), FA 45 (Comptroller), FA 47 (US Military Academy Permanent Faculty), FA 49 (Operations Research/Systems Analysis), FA 50 (Strategy and Force Development), and FA 52 (Nuclear Research and Operations). Note that Functional Areas 43 and 50 are new FAs.

The Operational Support (OS CF) strengthens current readiness while building the future force through its liaison, procurement, programming, and development specialties. This CF contains FA 48 (Foreign Area Officer) and the Army Acquisition Corps, which includes FA 51 (Research, Development and Acquisition), some FA 53B (Systems Automation Engineering), FA 53C (Systems Automation Acquisition), and FA 97 (Contracting and Industrial Management).

Source: Donna L. Coffman. 1997. OPMS to OPMS XXI: Then, Now and the Future – What does it mean to the Quartermaster officer? *Quartermaster Professional Bulletin* autumn: 49-53.

APPENDIX B

FORCE MANAGEMENT CYCLE



APPENDIX C

SURVEY

Force Management Survey

I need your help in addressing the institutional education/training provided to force managers at the division, corps, and Army service component command. Please provide honest and candid feedback. Your timely response is appreciated, the survey takes less than 5 minutes to complete.

Please do the following:

- Select your answer by placing an "X" in the corresponding box.
- The last two questions are qualitative, please provide your written input.
- When complete, email the results to dmonsivais@kc.r.com or daniel-monsivais@us.army.mil

1. Are you currently working in a designated Force Management position?

<input type="checkbox"/>	Yes
<input type="checkbox"/>	No

2. What staff level are you currently working?

<input type="checkbox"/>	Division
<input type="checkbox"/>	Corps
<input type="checkbox"/>	Army Service Component Command

3. What is your rank?

<input type="checkbox"/>	CPT
<input type="checkbox"/>	MAJ
<input type="checkbox"/>	LTC
<input type="checkbox"/>	COL

4. How long have you been in Force Management?

<input type="checkbox"/>	Less than 1 month
<input type="checkbox"/>	1-6 months
<input type="checkbox"/>	7-12 months
<input type="checkbox"/>	13-18 months
<input type="checkbox"/>	19-24 months
<input type="checkbox"/>	25-36 months
<input type="checkbox"/>	More than 37 months


5. Have you been in other Force Management positions?

<input type="checkbox"/>	No
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<input type="checkbox"/>	Yes
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If yes, was the position in a—


<input type="checkbox"/>	Division
<input type="checkbox"/>	Corps
<input type="checkbox"/>	Army Service Component Command



Did this position prepare you for your current job?

<input type="checkbox"/>	Yes
<input type="checkbox"/>	No

6. What institutions have you attended? **Mark all that apply.**

<input type="checkbox"/>	Command and General Staff College	}	
<input type="checkbox"/>	War College		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Army Logistics Management College		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Army Force Management School		

Command and General Staff College attendance prepared me for my current job.
Leave blank if not applicable)

<input type="checkbox"/>	Strongly Agree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Agree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Neither agree or disagree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Disagree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Strongly disagree

War College attendance prepared me for my current job.
Leave blank if not applicable)

<input type="checkbox"/>	Strongly Agree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Agree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Neither agree or disagree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Disagree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Strongly disagree

Army Logistics Management College attendance prepared me for my current job.
Leave blank if not applicable)

<input type="checkbox"/>	Strongly Agree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Agree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Neither agree or disagree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Disagree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Strongly disagree

Army Force Management School attendance prepared me for my current job.
Leave blank if not applicable)

<input type="checkbox"/>	Strongly Agree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Agree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Neither agree or disagree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Disagree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Strongly disagree

7. The institutional education that I have received has prepared me as a Force Manager.

<input type="checkbox"/>	Strongly Agree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Agree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Neither agree or disagree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Disagree
<input type="checkbox"/>	Strongly disagree

8. In your first Force Management job, how long did it take you to be functional?

- ☐ 0 Months
- ☐ 1-6 Months
- ☐ 7-12 Months
- ☐ 13-18 Months
- ☐ More than 18 Months

9. After completing the Force Management School, I was effective in the execution of my duties upon arrival to my Force Management job.

- ☐ Strongly Agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Neither agree or disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

10. I consider myself effective at preparing the Army Annual Command Plan at my level.

- ☐ Strongly Agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Neither agree or disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

11. I consider myself effective at preparing the Program Objective Memorandum at my level.

- ☐ Strongly Agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Neither agree or disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

12. I consider myself effective at preparing the change to MTOEs at my level.

- ☐ Strongly Agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Neither agree or disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

13. I consider myself effective at preparing Total Army Analysis at my level.

- ☐ Strongly Agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Neither agree or disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

On the next three questions, answer those that apply to your Force Management Experience.

14. Having worked at a **division** level staff, I was confident in the performance of my duties upon arrival.

- ☐ Never worked
- ☐ Strongly Agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Neither agree or disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

a. The number of months it took me to be functional.

- ☐ 0 Months
- ☐ 1-6 Months
- ☐ 7-12 Months
- ☐ 13-18 Months
- ☐ More than 18 Months

15. Having worked at a **corps** level staff, I was confident in the performance of my duties upon arrival.

- ☐ Never worked
- ☐ Strongly Agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Neither agree or disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

a. The number of months it took me to be functional.

- ☐ 0 Months
- ☐ 1-6 Months
- ☐ 7-12 Months
- ☐ 13-18 Months
- ☐ More than 18 Months

16. Having worked at a Army Service Component level staff, I was confident in the performance of my duties upon arrival.

- ☐ Never worked
- ☐ Strongly Agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Neither agree or disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

a. The number of months it took me to be functional.

- ☐ 0 Months
- ☐ 1-6 Months
- ☐ 7-12 Months
- ☐ 13-18 Months
- ☐ More than 18 Months

17. In retrospect, what training do you wish you had prior to assignment as a Force Manager?

18. Based on you experience, is there any specific training that you would recommend towards the preparation of future Force Managers?

This concludes the survey. Thank you for taking the time to answer the survey questions.

Enter or paste your text here.

APPENDIX D

QUALITATIVE SURVEY RESULTS

Qualitative Response to Survey Questions

Question 17. In retrospect, what training do you wish you had prior to assignment as a force manager?

Specific training on each of the Force Management functions (Doctrine, Training, Organizational, Materiel, and Combat development), the Force Development Process (Generate Requirements, Design Organizations Develop Organizational Models, Determine Organization Authorizations and Documentation of Organizational Authorizations), Total Army Analysis (TAA), Planning, Programming and Budgeting System, and Total Army Analysis. The AFMS or the few hours given in GCSC are not enough to develop us into well-rounded FA50 officers. We receive too much in too little time and training is too broad.
N/A
I believe all force managers should have a more up-to-date training on the Organization of the Army. Many officers are only exposed to their little part of the Army. We do get some training at the Force Management School but their needs to be more time spent on this subject to include a brake down of Joint Staffs. I say this because I have to work with the Combined Joint Staff in Korea and it took some time to understand how the Combined Joint Staff for US Forces Korea worked.
CGSC probably would have helped some. On FM specific issues, more emphasis on TAA, Command Plan, and the POM Cycle. Maybe a sub-course on TAA.
Documentation of force structure and the understanding of MTOE etc structure management.
The Force Management Course really needs to prepare Division-level Force Integration officers--which means they need to spend more time teaching officers about the force modernization process (it is not fun, it can be boring and tedious--but it really impacts training in a division). Additionally, the course needs to focus or at least address Command Plans. I never heard of a command plan until I arrived at my first assignment. The MAM course is a good background for the force mod process--it helped me as a division FI officer much more than the 50 course at Belvoir.
AFMS
The Army Force Management School, while and excellent course and the best I've ever attended while in the Army, it wasn't that relevant to what a Force Manager will do in a Division or Corps level job. I learned my Corps-level job while in my first Force Management assignment. Upon returning to the Corps level, I was very prepared. As an additional note, understanding digitization when working in III Corps is, perhaps, the bigger challenge.
More experience or exposure in fielding equipment. At the division level 90% of your effort revolves around equipment fieldings.... 10% dealing withMTOEs, System's Architectures, OPFAC, reorganization

There is nothing in my background that I would change. The issue is I have a tactical Cavalry background through Squadron S3 followed by a Combined/Joint NATO assignment in the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) G3 Training. As a result, I have had no practical experience as a FM. However, that is what I think makes me a good FM, not the technical aspect but the application to the tactical environment. Sure, I wish I had more FM experience but I would not trade it if given the option. The issue I have is I am in charge of the FM shop with no experience. Therefore, I rely on my leadership experience to accomplish the mission, e.g.: I have technical experts, it is my job to set their priorities, provide guidance and supervise - not be the technical expert on the POM, new equipment fielding or the Command Plan.
OJT as a younger, non-CFD'd officer would have been very helpful, but that's the luck of the pre/post Co Command assignment draw. Other than that, I do not really think that beyond AFMS there is any institutional training out there to prep new FA50 officers.
I would like to have been in an internship or pre-assignment status going into my gaining commands organization. That way I could have developed a better understanding of the structure and functions of the new organization. New organization was a totally new structure in which I had no previous experience in at a working level.
The training at the Force Management School did not really discuss what was expected from the force managers at the division, Corps, or ASCC levels. It was primarily focused on the kind of work performed up in DC.

Question 18. Based on your experience, is there any specific training that you would recommend towards the preparation of future force managers?

Specific training on each of the Force Management functions (Doctrine, Training, Organizational, Materiel, and Combat development), the Force Development Process (Generate Requirements, Design Organizations Develop Organizational Models, Determine Organization Authorizations and Documentation of Organizational Authorizations), Total Army Analysis (TAA), Planning, Programming and Budgeting System, and Total Army Analysis. The AFMS or the few hours given in GCSC are not enough to develop us into well-rounded FA50 officers. We receive too much in too little time and training is too broad.
The Force Management School.
An S4 background for MTOE issues would help, as well as an S3 background for fieldings. Understanding the Army Acquisition System when you come into a job would help a lot.
Documentation of MTOE etc and FDU, CTU etc. to talk knowledgeably with OIs DIs and SIs
We have to get the G8 more involved in the course at Belvoir. Right now, the focus is on the TAA, which is run by the G3. However, the majority of positions are in the G8.
AFMS is a MUST prior to any assignment as a Force Manager
This is tough. Based on the ODP (as I understand it) there are not many ODP-supported positions for FA50s in the Corps & Divisions. Therefore, it would not "pay" to train FA50s to do the Corps and Division functions. The Army Force Management Course does provide a background on these functions, but it is presented at the Army (macro) level. At the division and corps (micro) level, the actions and tasks you must undertake are different. I think it is very important for a Force Manager to understand digitization and the ABCS systems. This is especially true if you are going to work in III Corps, but - if you think about it - almost anywhere, understanding digitization is critical. No one teaches it - you learn it balancing on the pointy end of the spear!

Yes, Force Management school is a must but several topics must be expounded on to improve our effectiveness at the Corps and division level. Fielding equipment process and making changes to system's architectures and MTOE changes.
AFMS for sure. It may be even wiser to have folks go to their assignment first to learn what needs to be learned at the school first, then send them to school. I have done that with my folks, that way they know what to look for. When I went, having had NO exposure to FM, I did not know real world application to what I was learning. Other than that, experience. I think experience in all areas of FM as well not specializing in one area. It is the broad experience that helps the shop provide a better product with a wider application.
Extend AFMS and go into greater detail. Advance Courses/Captain's Career Courses are typically 6 months IOT prep a Captain for command and staff assignments. CGSC is nearly a year to do the same for Majors. Given the extremely complicated nature of Army Force Mgt there is no way a 1-month "overview" at AFMS is sufficient. I would also recommend bringing in current SMEs working in the field in a variety of areas such as TAA, POM build, Command Plan, etc. and have them provide the no kidding realities of the 5 Ws in their respective areas.
Internship with the gaining organization for up to 6 months to better understand function and organization of the gaining command before going to the AFMS.
Force managers should probably attend some sort of follow-on course that stresses hands on training in preparing command plans and MOTE change requests. (As a side note to questions 8 and 14a, I would like to point out that it took me 6 months to get comfortable with my job because the 101st didn't let me do my job for the first 3 months . . .they made me rear CP battle captain for War-fighter)

APPENDIX E

QUANTITATIVE SURVEY RESULTS

Question 1	Question 2	Question 3	Question 4	Question 5	Div	Corps	ASCC	Prepare?
yes	Corps	MAJ	More than 37 month	yes			x	yes
yes	ASCC	MAJ	13-18	no				
yes	ASCC	LTC	19-24	no				
yes	Div	MAJ	19-24	yes			x	no
yes	Div	MAJ	7-12 Months	no				
yes	ASCC	CPT	19-24 Months	yes			x	no
yes	ASCC	MAJ	13-18 Months	yes	x			yes
yes	Corps	MAJ	More than 37 month	yes			x	yes
yes	Corps	LTC	25-36 Months	yes			x	yes
yes	Div	LTC	More than 37 month	no				
yes	ASCC	LTC	13-18 Months	no				
yes	ASCC	MAJ	25-36 Months	yes			x	yes
yes	Div	MAJ	More than 37 month	yes			x	yes
yes	ASCC	MAJ	19-24 Months	yes	x			no

Question 6	CGSC	War College	ALMC	AFMS	CGSC	War College	ALMC	AFMS
	x			x	Disagree			Disagree
				x				
	x			x	Neither			Agree
				x				Strongly disagree
				x				Agree
				x				Disagree
			x	x			Agree	Agree
	x		x	x	Disagree		Agree	Strongly Agree
			x	x	Neither		Agree	Agree
	x		x	x	Neither		Neither	Strongly Agree
	x			x	Disagree			Agree
	x			x	Strongly Disagree			Agree
	x			x	Disagree			Agree

Question 7	Question 8	Question 9	Question 10	Question 11	Question 12	Question 13
Disagree	1-6 months	Neither	Strongly Agree	Disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree
Agree	1-6 months	Agree	Agree	Neither	Agree	Strongly agree
Disagree	1-6 months	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Neither	Agree
Neither	1-6 months	Neither	Neither	Neither	Neither	Neither
Neither	1-6 months	Neither	Agree	Neither	Strongly agree	Neither
Disagree	7-12 months	Disagree	Agree	Neither	Agree	Neither
Agree	1-6 months	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Agree
Agree	7-12 months	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Strongly agree	Agree
Agree	1-6 months	Agree	Neither	Neither	Agree	Agree
Agree	1-6 months	Agree	Agree	Agree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree
Neither	More than 18 Month	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree
Disagree	7-12 months	Strongly Agree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
Disagree	1-6 months	Agree	Strongly Agree	Disagree	Strongly agree	Neither
Disagree	1-6 months	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Strongly agree	Agree

Question 14	Months	Question 15	Months	Question 16	# of months
				Disagree	1-6 Months
				Agree	1-6 Months
Never		Never		Disagree	1-6 Months
Agree	1-6 Months	Neither	1-6 Months	Agree	1-6 Months
Never		Never		Never	
				Strongly disagree	7-12 Months
Disagree	1-6 Months	Never		Agree	0
Never		0 Strongly Agree	1-6 Months	Agree	7-12 months
		Agree		0 Disagree	1-6 Months
Strongly Agree	1-6 Months				
				Agree	More than 18 Months
Never		Never		Disagree	7-12 months
Strongly Agree		0		Disagree	1-6 Months
Disagree	1-6 Months			Disagree	1-6 Months

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